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Abstract
Following extensive empirical evidence about “market anomalies” and overconﬁdence, the analysis
of ﬁnancial markets with agents overconﬁdent about the precision of their private information has
received a lot of attention. However, all these models consider agents trading for their own account.
In this article, we analyse a standard delegated portfolio management problem between a ﬁnancial
institution and a money manager who may be of two types: rational or overconﬁdent. We consider
several situations. In each case, we derive the optimal contract and results on the performance of
ﬁnancial institution hiring overconﬁdent managers relative to institutions hiring rational agents, and
results on the price impact of overconﬁdence.
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11 Introduction
Following extensive empirical evidence about“market anomalies”1 and overconﬁdence2, the analysis of
ﬁnancial markets with overconﬁdent agents has received a lot of attention (see Kyle and Wang (1997),
Odean (1998), Wang (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Wang (2001)). 3
The common results of all these studies is that overconﬁdence always leads to overly risky investment
strategy but may also provide higher expected return.4
This last result led to conclusion about delegated portfolio management. For example, Kyle and
Wang (1997) conclude that “for some parameter values a fund facing a major rival in an eﬃcient market
should hire an overconﬁdent manager” and Wang (2001) shows that institutions hiring overconﬁdent
portfolio managers grow faster than those hiring rational managers. However, in order to reach these
conclusions, these studies implicitly assume that (i) overconﬁdence is an observable characteristic, and
(ii) managers’ incentives are aligned with those of the employing institution. What if these two as-
sumptions do not hold? What is then the compensation contract proposed by the ﬁnancial institution?
What are the consequences on the investment strategy of overconﬁd e n ta g e n t s ? I ns u c has i t u a t i o n ,
what is the impact of overconﬁdence on prices?
To answer these questions, we analyse a standard delegated portfolio management problem in which
ar i s kn e u t r a lﬁnancial institution (the principal) hires a money manager (the agent) with limited
liability who may be of two types: rational or overconﬁdent. If exerting eﬀort, the agent acquires
private information about the value of a risky asset. If the agent is rational, he updates his beliefs
about the expected value of the risky asset in a Bayesian fashion. However, if overconﬁdent, the agent
over-estimates the precision of his private signal. Based on his updated beliefs, the agent then makes
an investment decision. We consider two diﬀerent cases. First, the agent is risk-averse and price taker
(Case PT, hereafter). Second, the agent is risk-neutral and has market power. (Case MP, hereafter).
If hiring an overconﬁdent agent, the principal faces a moral hazard problem on both eﬀort and risk
1See Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998, Appendix I) for a review.
2See, for example, Alpert and Raiﬀa (1982) and Heath and Tversky (1991). See Odean (1998, Section II) for a review
of the literature.
3Another way of modelling irrational behavior is misinterpretation of the expected value of the asset traded (Delong,
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), Palomino (1996)).
4The exception is if agents are strategic (i.e., have market power) and do not trade simultaneously. In such a case,
overconﬁdence yields lower expected returns.
2(i.e., the amount invested in risky assets), in both cases PT and MP. If hiring a rational agent, the
principal faces a moral hazard problem on both risk and eﬀort in case PT but only a moral hazard
problem on eﬀort in case MP.
In Case PT, if overconﬁdence is an observable characteristic, we derive conditions under which
the contract oﬀered by the principal is ﬁrst-best. A consequence of the ﬁrst-best property is that both
rational and overconﬁdent agents choose the same investment strategy, i.e., that desired by the principal.
Hence, overconﬁdent and rational agents perform equally well and undertake the same amount of risk.
This result implies that results about overconﬁdence obtained in the case of agents trading for own
account may not hold in the case of delegated portfolio management since the contract oﬀered by the
principal modiﬁes investment incentives.
If overconﬁdence is not observable, we derive conditions under which there exists a separating
equilibrium such that the principal oﬀers a menu of contracts, rational and overconﬁdent agents choose
diﬀerent contracts, rational agents exert a low eﬀort and overconﬁdent agent exert a high eﬀort. In this
equilibrium, overconﬁdent agents perform better (earn higher expected return) and undertake less risk
(the variance of return is lower) than rational agents. This result is due to the fact that the contracts
proposed by the principal align the risk taking incentives of the overconﬁdent agent with his owns’
while still giving incentives to overconﬁdent agents to acquire a large amount of information (given
their beliefs.)
In Case MP, we assume that trading takes place in a market similar to that described in Easley
and O’Hara (1987). If overconﬁdence is observable, then, as in Case PT, we derive conditions under
which the contract oﬀered by the principal is ﬁrst-best. Hence, rational and overconﬁdent agents choose
the same investment strategy. This implies that overconﬁdence does not have any impact on prices if
informed agents trade on the behalf of a principal, while overconﬁdence would have some price impact
if informed agents were trading for their own account. This results shows that results about the price
impact of overconﬁdence depend on whether one considers trading for own account or delegated portfolio
management. In the latter case, contracts oﬀered by the principal inﬂuence investment strategies, hence
the impact of overconﬁdence on prices.
If overconﬁdence is not observable, we show that overconﬁdence has an impact on prices in situations
in which rational and overconﬁdent agents do not acquire the same amount of information. In such
situations, the market maker does not know whether informed trades come from rational of overconﬁdent
3agents. As a consequence, he does not know the precision of the information of the informed agent.
Therefore, if the market maker operates in a competitive environment (as is usually assumed in market
microstructure models), then the quotes he posts take into account the fact that an informed order may
come either from a rational agent or an overconﬁdent agent.
Our results have several implications. First, in terms of accumulation of wealth. In this respect,
they should be compared to those of Wang (2001). If overconﬁdence is observable, then a principal can
choose what type of agent to hire and the contract proposed to an overconﬁdent agent diﬀers from that
oﬀered to a rational agent in two ways. First, given that an agent overconﬁdent about the precision
of his private information believes that he will realize a good performance with a higher probability
than the correct one, he accepts ”cheaper” contracts than a rational agent does. This information
eﬀect makes overconﬁdent agents more attractive than rational agents for the principal. Second, if the
overconﬁdent agent is also overconﬁdent about his outside opportunities, the minimum expected utility
or revenue he accepts to derive from money management is higher than that accepted by a rational
agent. This outside-option eﬀect makes overconﬁdent agents less attractive than rational agents for the
principal. If the information eﬀect dominates the outside-option eﬀect, then our results are similar to
those of Wang (2001): ﬁnancial institution hiring overconﬁdent agents grow faster than those hiring
rational agents. However, in our model, the result is not due to strategic market interaction between
rational and overconﬁdence acting as a commitment to trade aggressively (as in Kyle and Wang (1997)
and Wang (2001)). This is due to their acceptance of ”cheap” contracts that rational agents refuse.
Conversely, if the outside-option eﬀect dominates the information eﬀect, then ﬁnancial institution hiring
rational agents grow faster than those hiring overconﬁdent agents.
Second our results have implication for the debate on the origin of very high trading volume in
ﬁnancial markets. As already mentioned, the literature on overconﬁdence has established that over-
conﬁdent agents trade too large quantities. In the case of delegated portfolio management, Dow and
Gorton (1997) provide a second reason for excessive trading volume: agency problem between principals
and agents who want to show that they are informed, hence are very active in the market. Our results
suggest that a principal oﬀering the appropriate contract can mitigate agents’ incentives to trade due
to overconﬁdence. Hence, excessive trading volume would have two sources: overconﬁdence of agents
trading for own account and agency problem in the case of delegated portfolio management.
Last, our results also stress the diﬀerence between trading for proper account and delegated portfolio
4management when comparing the performances of various categories of agents. If trading for their own
account, overconﬁdent agents perform better than rational ones (i.e., earn higher expected return and
expected utility) if there is strategic market interaction. However, in the case of delegated portfolio
management with observable overconﬁdence, overconﬁdent agents always perform worse than rational
ones. Principals (i.e., ﬁnancial institutions) receive all the beneﬁt from their overconﬁdence.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3
presents the model with a risk-averse, price-taking agent and consider trading for own account as a
benchmark case. Section 4 presents the results in case of delegated portfolio management. Section 5
analyses the case with a risk-neutral agent with market power while Section 6 concludes. All the proofs
are contained in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
Our article bridges the literature on delegated portfolio management and that on overconﬁdence in
ﬁnancial markets.
Bhattacharya and Pﬂeiderer (1985) were the ﬁrst to study delegated portfolio management in a
principal-agent framework. However, their model is more one of hidden information rather than hidden
action since the principal can verify the level of risk taken by the agent.5
Cohen and Starks(1988), Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1996), Diamond (1998), Palomino and Prat (2003)
study delegated portfolio management with moral hazard on both eﬀort and risk. Cohen and Stark
(1988) derive conditions under which the manager exerts more eﬀort but chooses a riskier portfolio than
investors prefer. Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1996) look at the impact of benchmarking on behavior. They
show that, in general, benchmarking is inconsistent with obtaining the optimal portfolio and tends to
decrease incentives to exert eﬀort. Diamond (1998) show that if the control space of the agent has full
dimensionality, (i.e., the principal has fewer degrees of freedom in setting the incentives than the agent
has degrees of freedom in responding), then as the cost of eﬀort shrinks, the optimal contracts converges
to a linear contract. Palomino and Prat (2003) consider the case in which the agent has limited liability.
They show that there exists an optimal contract which takes the form of a bonus contract.
The inﬂuence of overconﬁdence on contracts has been studied by Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2002)
5This type of problem is also analysed in Stoughton (1993).
5and Hackbart (2002). Gervais, Heaton and Odean consider a capital budgeting problem faced by a risk
averse manager who may be overoptimistic or overconﬁdent. They ﬁnd that a risk neutral principal may
be better oﬀ hiring a moderately overconﬁdent agent than rational one. The main diﬀerence between
their study and ours is that we study the case in which the overconﬁdence level of the managers is
not observable and the agent has the choice between several eﬀort levels. In such a case, the principal
cannot oﬀer ﬁrst-best contract. However, we show that the principal can use a menu of contracts to
screen agents.
Harckbart (2002) studies the impact of overconﬁdence on capital structure and also looks at contracts
based on a cash salary, a bonus, an equity stake, and executive stock options. However, the optimal
contract is not derived.
The consequences of overconﬁdence in ﬁnancial markets has been studied both in the context of
perfectly and imperfectly competitive markets. Under the assumption of perfect competition, Odean
(1998, Section III.A) studies a market in which all informed agents are overconﬁdent about the precision
of their information. He shows that as overconﬁdence increases, trading volume and price volatility
increase and overconﬁdent agents’ expected utility is lower than if their beliefs were properly calibrated.
Daniel et al.(1998) study price reactions to public and private information. They show that overcon-
ﬁdence increases price volatility around private signals, and that price moves resulting from the arrival
of private information are on average partially reversed in the long run.
Wang (2001, Section III) studies population dynamics in the presence of rational and overconﬁdent
agents. He shows that if overconﬁdent agents are moderately overconﬁdent and their initial share of
then population is above some treshold, then overconﬁdent agents as a group will dominate the economy
in the long run.
Finally, Daniel et al. (2001) derive an asset pricing model taking into account agents’ overconﬁdence.
In an economy in which agents are risk averse with negative exponential utility, and uncertainty is
normally distributed, they show that price overreacts to private signals and true expected returns
decompose additively into a risk premium and components arising from mispricing.
In imperfectly competitive markets, Odean (1998, Section III.A) shows that overconﬁdence can lead
to market breakdowns, and that when a market equilibrium exists, expected volume, market depth,
price volatility and the level of informational eﬃciency increase as the insider’s overconﬁdence increase.
Kyle and Wang (1997) and Wang (2001, Section II) show that in market with two informed agents,
6overconﬁdence acts as a commitment to trade aggressively. As a consequence, an overconﬁdent informed
agent may earn a higher expected utility than a rational one and overconﬁdent agents may dominate
the economy in the long run.
Finally, Caballe and Sakovics (2003) diﬀerentiate between private self-conﬁd e n c e( t h es e l fc o n ﬁdence
of the speculators) and public self-conﬁdence (the self-conﬁdence they attribute the their competitors).
They show that public self-conﬁdence and private self-conﬁdence have diﬀerent eﬀects (sometime oppo-
site) on trading volume, price volatility, informational eﬃciency and expected proﬁts.
3 The model
We consider the following economy. There is one risky asset and a risk-free asset with return normalized
to 1. The return V of the risky asset is VH > 1 with probability 1/2, VL < 1 with probability 1/2, and
E(V )=1 .
If exerting eﬀo r ta tac o s tc, the agent receives private information. The signal he receives is either
sH or sL. Conditional on signals, the distribution of the return of the risky asset is
Prob(Vi|si)=( 1+k)/2 j = H,L
Prob(Vi|sj)=( 1− k)/2 i = H,L, j = H,L, i 6= j
with k ∈ (0,1).
We deﬁne overconﬁdence as in Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2002). That is, after receiving a signal
si (i = H,L), an overconﬁdence agent believes that
Prob(Vi|si)=( 1+K)/2 j = H,L
Prob(Vi|sj)=( 1− K)/2 i = H,L, j = H,L, i 6= j
with K ∈ (k,1). Hence, overconﬁdence means that the agent perceives the information as more reliable
than what it really is. The diﬀerence K − k ∈ (0,1 − k) measures the degree of overconﬁdence of the
agent.




with γ ∈ (0,1).
73.1 Benchmark case: Trading for own account
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an agent with overconﬁdence level K acquires information and trades a quantity x(K,c,si) when receiv-
ing a signal si.
(ii) T h ee x p e c t e dr e t u r no fa no v e r c o n ﬁdent agent is larger than that of a rational agent
(iii) The variance of return of an overconﬁdent agent is larger than that of a rational agent.
These results are similar to those of De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), Odean (1998)
and Wang (2001) in the context of perfectly competitive markets. Overconﬁdence (or overoptimism)
generates incentives to trade larger quantities than rational agents. As a consequence, overconﬁdent
agents earn a higher expected return but their investment is riskier.
4 Delegated portfolio management
The principal is risk-neutral and cannot acquire information at any cost. This implies that if he does not
hire an agent, his expected revenue is zero. The amount invested in the risky asset x belongs to [−¯ x, ¯ x].
This means that there is an upper limit to the amount the agent can borrow to invest in the risky asset
or shortsell. To make the problem interesting, we assume ¯ x>x (K,c,sH)a n d−¯ x<x (K,c,sL).
8We denote ¯ UK ≥ 0 the reservation expected utility of the agent. If ¯ UK is increasing in K,i tm e a n s
that the agent’s overconﬁdence has two dimensions: precision of private information and the value of
outside options. Conversely, if for all K, ¯ UK = ¯ U,t h e no v e r c o n ﬁd e n c eh a so n es i n g l ed i m e n s i o n :t h e
precision of the private information.
We also assume that the agent has limited liability, hence cannot receive a negative compensation.
In such a situation, if an agent acquires information and acts in the interest of the principal, he
trades a quantity ¯ x if he receives the signal s = sH and he trades a quantity −¯ x if he receives the signal
s = sL.
If hired, the portfolio chosen by the agent is not veriﬁable. Therefore, it cannot be contracted upon.
It follows that the moral hazard problem faced by the principal is twofold. He must provide the agent
incentives to 1) exert eﬀort and acquire information, and 2) take the appropriate level of risk.
We consider two cases. First, overconﬁdence is observable. That is the level of overconﬁdence of the
agent is common knowledge to the principal and the agent. In the second case, we will assume that the
principal does not know whether he is making an oﬀer to a rational or an overconﬁdent agent.
4.1 Overconﬁdence is observable
Denote R[x(si),V j]( i,j = H,L) the realized return of the agent if he trades a quantity x after having
received a signal si and Vj is realized, i.e.,
R[x(si),V j]=1+x(si)(Vj − 1)
with (j 6= i)
As is standard in contract theory, the principal has all the bargaining power and makes a take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer to the agent (see, e.g., Salanie (1997) and Laﬀont and Martimort (2001) for surveys on
contract theory).
Denote EK(.)a n dEk(.) the expectation operators using overconﬁdent or rational beliefs, respec-
tively. The problem of the principal is to choose a contract h∗(R) which maximizes
1
2
(Ek{R(x∗(sH),V) − h[R(x∗(sH),V)]|sH} + Ek{R(x∗(sL),V) − h[R(x∗(sL),V)]|sL})( 5 )
subject to
x∗(si) ∈ argmaxEK{U[h∗(R(x,V ) − c)]|si} i = H,L (6)
9x∗(∅) ∈ argmaxE{U[h∗(R(x,V ))]|∅} (7)






EK{U[h∗(R(x∗(sL),V))−c]|sL} ≥ E{U[h∗(R(x∗(∅),V))]|∅} (8)
1
2
EK{U[h∗(R(x∗(sH),V)) − c]|sH} +
1
2
EK{U[h∗(R(x∗(sL),V)) − c]|sL} ≥ ¯ UK (9)
h∗[R(x∗(si),V j)] ≥ ci , j = H,L (10)
Equations (6) and (7) are the incentive compatibility constraints on risk if the agent has acquired
information and has not acquired information, respectively. Equation (8) represents the incentive com-
patibility constraint on eﬀort while Equations (9) and (10) represent the participation and limited
liability constraints, respectively.





α0 if R ≤ 1
α1 + βR if R>1
(11)
with β > 0, an informed agent trades quantities x(sH)=¯ x and x(sL)=−¯ x.
Lemma 2 means that a contract of the shape of h solves the moral hazard problem on risk.
Deﬁnition 3 Ac o n t r a c th∗ is ﬁr s tb e s ti fi ti sas o l u t i o no ft h ep r o g r a m( 5 ) - ( 10) such that the agent
chooses (i) x(sH)=¯ x, x(sL)=−¯ x and (ii) EK[U(h∗)] = ¯ UK.
Hence, a contract is said to be ﬁrst-best if the agent chooses the same trading strategy as that the
principal would chooses were trading for his own account (Condition (i)) and the contract leaves no
rent to the agent (Condition (ii)). We derive now conditions under which such a contract exist.















0(K) are given by Equations (15) and (16), respectively, in Appendix.
10From Lemma 2 and Proposition 4, we deduce that rational and overconﬁdent agents make the
same investment decisions. In other words, the optimal contracts align overconﬁdent and rational
agents’ investment incentives. This result highlights the diﬀerences between trading for own account
and delegated portfolio management when dealing with the impact of overconﬁdence on investment
strategies.
Corollary 5 Assume that for all K ∈ (k,1),aﬁr s tb e s tc o n t r a c th∗
K exists and ¯ UK = ¯ U.T h e n ,
(i) α∗
0(K) and α∗
1(K) are decreasing functions of K.
(ii) α∗
0(K) and α∗
1(K) are increasing functions of ¯ U.
The corollary implies that if overconﬁdence has one single dimension (i.e., the precision of the private
information), then principals prefer to hire overconﬁdent agents. However, this is not due to better
performance by overconﬁdent agents. Here, rational and overconﬁdent agents perform equally well.
Principals prefer to hire overconﬁdent agents because they accept “cheaper” contracts than rational
agents (i.e., the expected compensation paid to an overconﬁdent agent is lower than that to a rational
agent.)
Conversely, if overconﬁdence has two dimensions (i.e., the precision of the private information and
the value of outside options), then a principal who has the choice between hiring a rational and an
overconﬁdent agent faces a trade-oﬀ. The information eﬀect of overconﬁdence (part (i) of the corollary)
makes overconﬁdent agent accept cheap contract. However, the outside-option eﬀect (part (ii) of the
corollary) makes the contract accepted by overconﬁdent agents more expensive than that accepted by
rational agent. Hence, if the information eﬀect dominates the outside-option eﬀect, the principal is
better oﬀ hiring an overconﬁdent agent. If the outside-option eﬀect dominates, then the principal is
better oﬀ hiring a rational agent.
These results should be compared to those of Wang (2001) on the comparison of performances
between rational and overconﬁdent money managers. If the only dimension of overconﬁdence is the
precision of the private information, then the results of Wang (2001) hold when the compensation
contract of the agent is taken into account. However, ﬁnancial institution hiring overconﬁdent agents
do not accumulate more wealth than those hiring rational agents because overconﬁdent agents perform
better than rational agents but because, overconﬁdent agents accept cheaper contracts than rational
agent.
11Conversely, if overconﬁdence has two dimensions and the outside-option eﬀect dominates the infor-
mation eﬀect, then ﬁnancial institution hiring rational agents accumulate more wealth that those hiring
overconﬁdent agent. In this case, rational agents are those accepting cheaper contracts.
4.2 Overconﬁdence is not observable
We assume now that the principal cannot observe whether the agent is rational or overconﬁdent. The
principal correctly believes that the agent is overconﬁdent with probability θ and rational with proba-
bility 1 − θ.
With respect to the case of observable types, the principal faces an additional incentive compatibility
constraint. If the ﬁrst-best contract h∗
k is oﬀered (such that the participation constraint of a rational
agent is binding), then the participation constraint of an overconﬁdent agent is not binding. In other
words, this contract leaves some rent to an overconﬁdent agent. As a consequence, an overconﬁdent
agent prefers the contract h∗
k relative to the contract h∗
K. This implies that if overconﬁdence is not
observable, then the principal faces a trade-oﬀ. Either he proposes the contract h∗
k which is accepted
by both types of agents (but leaves some rent to an overconﬁdent agent), or the principal proposes the
contract h∗
K which will be rejected by the agent with probability (1 − θ), i.e., if the agent happens to
be rational. We derive the following result.
Proposition 6 Assume that ﬁrst-best contracts h∗
k and h∗
K exist and for all K ∈ (k,1), ¯ UK = ¯ U.T h e r e
exists ¯ θ such that if θ > ¯ θ, the principal only oﬀers the contract h∗
K. The contract is accepted by an
overconﬁdent agent and rejected by a rational one. If θ < ¯ θ, then the principal proposes the contract h∗
k
a n di ti sa c c e p t e db yb o t ht y p e so fa g e n t s .
The Proposition states that if overconﬁdence has one single dimension, the agent’s trade does not
inﬂuence prices (hence, returns), and the probability that the agent is overconﬁdent is large (i.e., larger
than ¯ θ), then the principal is willing to screen agents and only hires overconﬁdent agents. If the
probability than the agent is overconﬁdent is small (i.e., smaller than ¯ θ), then both types of agents are
hired.
124.3 Two levels of information.
So far, we have assumed that there is only one level of private information. As a consequence, the only
possible separating equilibrium is such that only overconﬁdent agent are hired. Here, we extend the
previous analysis by assuming that there are two levels (1 and 2) of private information. If a rational
manager pays a cost ci (i =1 ,2a n dc1 <c 2), he receives a signal si,j (j = H,L)s u c ht h a t
Prob(Vj|sij)=( 1+ki)/2 j = H,L
Prob(Vj|sij0)=( 1− ki)/2 j = H,L, j0 = H,L, j0 6= j
with ki ∈ (0,1) and k1 <k 2.
Hence, if exerting a high eﬀort and paying a high cost (c2), the manager receives a more precise
information than if exerting a low eﬀort and paying a low cost (c1).
After paying a cost ci (i =1 ,2) and receiving a signal sij (j = H,L), an overconﬁdent agent believes
that
Prob(Vj|sij)=( 1+Ki)/2 j = H,L
Prob(Vj|sij0)=( 1− Ki)/2 j = H,L, j0 = H,L, j 6= j0
with Ki ∈ (ki,1) and K1 <K 2.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that ¯ UK = 0 and restrict our attention to contracts of the
shape of (11). From Lemma 2, we know that these contracts solve the moral hazard problem on risk.









then there exists ¯ c>0, ¯ δ > 0 and ¯ θ < 1 such that if c1 < ¯ c, c2 − c1 < ¯ δ and θ > ¯ θ,t h e nt h e r ee x i s t sa
separating equilibrium such that
(i) the principal oﬀers a menu of contracts (h(R|c1,α1
1),h(R|c2,α2
1)),
(ii) a rational agent chooses the contract h(R|c1,α1
1) and exerts a low eﬀort,
(iii) an overconﬁdent agent chooses (h(R|c2,α2
1) a n de x e r tah i g he ﬀort.
The proposition states that for some sets of parameters, types are revealed in equilibrium, over-
conﬁdent agents exert a high eﬀort and rational agents exert a low eﬀort. The contract oﬀered by the
principal aligns rational and overconﬁdent agents’ investment incentives but leaves overconﬁdent agent
with more incentives to acquire information given their beliefs.
13To complete the Proposition, it should also be mentioned that there is no separating equilibrium
such that rational agent exerts a high eﬀort and overconﬁdent agent exerts low eﬀort, the reason being
that any contract which provides a rational agent with incentives to exert a high eﬀort, also provides
an overconﬁd e n ta g e n tt oe x e r tah i g he ﬀort.
One can wonder whether agents have incentives to signal their type before the contract is proposed.
This is not the case. The contract accepted by overconﬁdent agents is the same as that they would get
if types were observable. As a consequence, they are indiﬀerent between revealing their type or not. A
rational agent is better oﬀ if types are not observable. The reason is that if types are observable, the
principal oﬀers one contract to each type of agent. In such a case, the optimal contract is such that
a rational agent is better oﬀ exerting low eﬀort rather than no eﬀort. When types are not observable,
the principal faces an additional constraint. The contract h(R|c1,α1
1) must provide an expected com-
pensation high enough so that a rational agent does not deviate to choose h(R|c2,α2
1)a n ds t i l le x e r ta
low eﬀort. As a consequence, a rational agent is better oﬀ when types are not observable, hence has no
incentives to reveal his type.
The separating equilibrium described in Proposition 7 has implication for the comparison of perfor-
mances and risk undertaken by rational and overconﬁdent agent.
Corollary 8 Assume that the separating equilibrium of Proposition 7 holds. Then,
(i) Overconﬁdent agents perform better than rational agents (i.e., their expected return is higher than
that of rational agents).
(ii) Overconﬁdent agents take less risk than rational agents (i.e., the variance of return of overconﬁdent
agents is lower than that of rational agents)
Part (ii) of the corollary contrasts with previously established results showing that overconﬁdence
leads to investment strategies riskier than those of rational agents. However, these results were obtained
in the context of agents trading for their own account. Corollary 8 shows how, in the context of delegated
portfolio management, the contract oﬀered by the principal inﬂuences investment incentives and the
risk taking behaviour of overconﬁdent agents relative to rational agents.
145 Extension: A risk-neutral strategic agent.
In this section, we consider a situation in which the agent is risk neutral and has market power when
trading the risky asset. As a consequence, overconﬁdence will have an impact on prices.
As in the previous sections, we assume that there is one risky asset. Its value V is VH > 1w i t h
probability 1/2, VL < 1 with probability 1/2a n dE(V )=1 .T h i sa s s e ti st r a d e di nam a r k e ts i m i l a rt o
that described in Easley and O’Hara (1987). That is, three types of agents participate in the market:
a market maker, noise traders and the informed agent. With equal probabilities, noise traders buy
a small quantity (Z1), buy a large quantity (Z2), sell a low quantity (−Z1) , or sell a large quantity
(−Z2). The timing of the trading game is the following. The market maker posts bid and ask prices
for the various quantities submitted. With probability 1/2, an order is sent to the market maker by
the informed agent, and with probability 1/2, it is sent by a noise trader. The market maker operates
in a competitive environment. This implies that for any order (X) that he receives, the market maker
expects zero proﬁt from trade. After trading takes place, the value V of the asset is realized.
If the agent acquires information, then the precision of his signal and his beliefs are as in the previous
sections.
5.1 Benchmark case: Trading for own account.
Assume that the informed agent’s beliefs are common knowledge. When trading for his own account,
the informed agent acts so as to maximize his expected proﬁt. Denote P(X) the price posted by the
market for a trading order X. We have the following results about strategies and market prices.
Proposition 9 Let ρ = Z2/Z1.
(i) If ρ ≥ 3K
3K−2k, then there exists a unique separating equilibrium: an agent who observes a signal sH









((1 − k)VH +( 1+k)VL +1 )
(ii) If ρ < 3K
3K−2k< 3 then there exists a unique pooling equilibrium: an agent receiving a signal sH (sL)
trades a quantity Z2 (-Z2) with probability µ∗
K and trades a quantity Z1 (-Z1) with a probability (1−µ∗
K)
15where µ∗
K is the unique positive solution of Equation (45) in Appendix. For all X diﬀerent from Z1,
Z2, −Z1 and −Z2, P(X)=1 .
P(Z2)=
µ∗















K[(1 + k)VL +( 1− k)VH]+1
2µ∗
K +1
The proposition states that overconﬁdence has an impact on the bid-ask spread when agents trade
for their own account. First, if ρ ∈ [3K/(3K − 2k),3] and the insider is rational then there is a strictly
positive bid-ask spread for both small and large quantities. Conversely, if the insider is overconﬁdent,
he always trade large quantities, hence P(Z1)−P(−Z1) = 0. Second, if ρ < 3K/(3K −2k), then there
are positive bid-ask spreads for both small and large quantities. However, these spreads are diﬀerent if
the insider is rational or overconﬁdent. The reason is that, due to their diﬀerence in beliefs, diﬀerent
types of traders use diﬀerent probabilities for randomization between the small and the large quantity
in equilibrium, i.e., the unique positive solution of Equation (45) is diﬀerent if K = k (rational insider)
and if K>k(overconﬁdent insider).
5.2 Delegated portfolio management
As in Section 4, we assume that the principal does not have access to private information (hence, if he
does not hire an agent his expected proﬁt from trading is zero) and the agent has limited liability, and
a reservation utility ¯ UK ≥ 0.
First, we assume that overconﬁdence is observable. Two cases have to be distinguished. If ρ > 3,
then there is no moral hazard on risk. Provided that the agent acquires information, the principal and
the agent’s incentives are aligned. This implies that the principal only faces moral hazard on eﬀort
when hiring an agent. Conversely, if ρ ∈ [3K/(3K − 2k),3], then the principal also faces moral hazard
on risk: the expected trading volume of the agent is too large (i.e., if maximizing his expected return,
the agent trades a quantity |Z2| with probability 1.)
16Note that, with respect to the Section 4, the moral hazard problem on risk is diﬀerent. Here, the
o b j e c t i v eo ft h ep r i n c i p a li st or e d u c et h et r a d i n gi n t e n s i t yo ft h ea g e n tw h i l ei nS e c t i o n4 ,t h ep r i n c i p a l
was aiming at increasing trading quantities.
The following proposition derives conditions under which contracts align overconﬁdent agents’ in-
centives with those of rational agents.
Proposition 10 (i) Assume that ρ > 3.I f0 < ¯ UK < Z2
2(1+k)[(1 + k)VH +( 1− k)VL − 2] and c<K¯ UK






0 if π ≤ 0
2(¯ UK+c)
1+K − Z2(VH − P(Z2)) + π if π > 0
(12)
The agent acquires information and trades a quantity Z2 (−Z2) when observing sH (sL).
(ii) Assume that ρ < 3.T h e r e e x i s t s¯ ¯ U>0 such that if 0 < ¯ UK < ¯ ¯ U,a n dc<K¯ UK then there





0 if π ≤ 0
2(¯ UK+c)
1+K if π > 0
(13)
An agent receiving a signal sH (sL)t r a d e saq u a n t i t yZ2 (-Z2) with probability µ∗
k and trades a quantity
Z1 (-Z1) with a probability (1−µ∗
k) where µ∗
k is the unique positive solution of Equation (45) with K = k.
The proposition states than when the principal only faces moral hazard on eﬀort (i.e., ρ ≥ 3), then
there is a contract of the shape described in Lemma 2 which is optimal.
Conversely, when the principal also faces moral hazard on risk (i.e., ρ < 3), such contracts are not
optimal. In order to limit the agent’s risk taking incentive, there must be a cap to the compensation
he receives. This result is along the lines of Palomino and Prat (2003).
We deduce that for parameters such that Proposition 10 holds then rational and overconﬁdent
agents choose the same investment strategy. This implies that overconﬁdence does not inﬂuence bid-ask
spreads (hence prices) in the case of delegated portfolio management, although overconﬁdent agents
have market power.
5.3 Overconﬁdence is not observable
We assume that overconﬁdence is not observable and the principal and the market maker correctly
believe (ex-ante) that the agent is overconﬁdent with probability θ and rational with probability 1−θ.
17From Proposition 10, we deduce that if for all K ∈ (k,1), ¯ UK = ¯ U, then the optimal contracts
for overconﬁdent agents are cheaper than those for rational agents. Therefore, if overconﬁdence is not
observable, the principal faces the same trade-oﬀ as in the case of a price-taking agent: if ρ > 3( ρ < 3)
either the principal proposes the contract ho
k (gk) which is accepted by both types of agents (but leaves
some rent to an overconﬁdent agent), or the principal proposes the contract ho
K (gK) which will be
rejected by the agent with probability (1−θ), i.e., if the agent happens to be rational. Hence, we have
the same type of result as in the previous section.
Proposition 11 Assume that overconﬁdence is not observable and for all K ∈ (k,1), ¯ UK = ¯ U and
ﬁrst-best contracts ho
K and gK exist. Then, there exists ¯ θ such that if θ > ¯ θ,i fρ > 3 then the principal
only oﬀers the contract ho
K and if ρ < 3 the principal only oﬀers the contract gK. The contracts are
accepted by an overconﬁdent agent and rejected by a rational one.
Here, again, if overconﬁdence has one single dimension (the interpretation of private information),
the principal can screen agents with contracts and only hire overconﬁdent agents. However, since optimal
contracts align overconﬁdent agents’ investment incentives with those of rational agents, overconﬁdence
does not have any impact on bid-ask spreads.
If there are two levels of information, the situation is diﬀerent. In equilibria in which rational and
overconﬁdent agents pool on the same eﬀort level, then overconﬁdence will not have an impact on the
bid-ask spread since the principal will oﬀer contracts of the shape of ho
j and gj (j = k,k)i nt h e s e
equilibria. Conversely, in equilibria in which rational and overconﬁdent agents do not pool on the same
eﬀort level, overconﬁdence always has an impact on bid-ask spreads. To see this, consider a situation
in Z2/Z1 is large and conditions similar to those of Proposition 7 hold (i.e., c1 and c2 − c1 are small
and (1 + K2)/(1 + K1)a n dθ are large). In such a case, a rational agent chooses the low eﬀort level,
an overconﬁdent agents chooses a high eﬀort level and both types of agents trade large quantities with
probability 1. If overconﬁdence is not observable, then the expected value of the asset conditional on




[θEk2(V |sH)+( 1− θ)Ek1(V |sH)+1 ]
Since market makers operate in a competitive environment, P(Z2)=E(V |Z2). This implies that
overconﬁdence has an impact on price. However, this is not due to trading intensity. This is due to
over-acquisition of information by overconﬁdent agents.
186 Conclusion
We have studied models of delegated portfolio management in which a risk neutral principal hires an
agent who is either rational or overconﬁdent.
When overconﬁdence is observable, we have derived conditions under which the contract proposed
to the agents is ﬁrst best. This implies that the optimal contract fully aligns overconﬁdent agents’
incentives to invest with those of rational agents. As a consequence, overconﬁdent and rational agents
perform equally well. This implies that if agents have market power, then overconﬁdence does not have
any impact on prices.
When overconﬁdence is not observable, we have derived conditions under which there exists a sepa-
rating equilibrium such that the principal oﬀers a menu of contracts, rational and overconﬁdent agents
choose diﬀerent contracts, rational agents exert a low eﬀort while overconﬁdent agent exert a high eﬀort.
In this situation, overconﬁdent managers may perform better than rational managers and take less risk
and if they have market power, they will have an impact on prices
These results have consequences for the analysis of the price impact of overconﬁdence. If overcon-
ﬁdence can be detected before proposing compensation contracts (i.e., overconﬁdence is observable),
then contracts can align overconﬁdent agents’ risk taking incentives with those of rational agents. This
implies that the price impact of overconﬁdence should be small. If overconﬁdence is not observable,
it will have an impact on price if it leads to over-acquisition of information by overconﬁdent money
managers.
Our article extends the current literature on the performance and risk taking behaviour of over-
conﬁdent agents in ﬁnancial markets. In particular, it shows the diﬀerence between comparing the
performance of agents trading for their own account and comparing performances in the context of
delegated portfolio management.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1





(1 + K)[1 − c + x(VH − 1)]1−γ +( 1− K)[1 − c + x(VL − 1)]1−γ¢
The ﬁrst-order condition of utility maximization yields
(1 + K)(VH − 1)[1 − c + x(VH − 1)]−γ +( 1− K)(VL − 1)[1 − c + x(VL − 1)]−γ =0
This is equivalent to
x = x(K,c,sH)=
(AH(K) − 1)(1 − c)
(VH − 1) + AH(K)(1 − VL)





where Uo(K,sH)a n dUo(K,sL) are given by Equation (3). The agent acquires information if U>1.







P r o o fo f( i i )The expected return of the agent is
R(K)=1+
(1+k)
4 [x(K,c,sH)(VH − 1) + x(K,c,sL)(VL − 1)]
+
(1−k)
4 [x(K,c,sH)(VL − 1) + x(K,c,sL)(VH − 1)]
Since AH and AL are increasing and decreasing in K, respectively. This implies that x(K,c,sH)
and x(K,c,SL) are increasing and decreasing in K, respectively. Hence, R(K) is increasing in K.
Proof of (iii) Given that (VH +VL)/2 = 1, we have 1−VL = VH −1, and x(K,c,sL)=−x(K,c,sH).
T h ev a r i a n c eo ft h er e t u r ni st h e n
Va r K = x2
H(1 − k2)(VH − 1)2
where xH stands for x(K,c,sH). Given that AH(K) is increasing in K, xH is increasing in K. Hence,
Va r K in increasing in K. 2
6The proof for the case s = sL is identical.
20Proof of Lemma 2: Given that h(R)i sc o n s t a n ti fR ≤ 1 and increasing in R if R>1, it is
straightforward that the agent will trade a positive quantity when receiving a signal sH and will trade












(α1 + βx(VH − 1))
1−γ
(1 − γ)











(α1 + βx(VL − 1))
1−γ
(1 − γ)
EK[U(h∗)|sH]a n dEK[U(h∗)|sL] are increasing and decreasing in x, respectively. Hence, the agent
chooses x(sH)=¯ x and x(sL)=−¯ x. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
Proof: The proof is divided in three steps.






0 if R ≤ 1
α∗




(1 − k)(1 + K)




1 = c − 1 − ¯ x(VH − 1) +
µ
2(1 − γ)¯ UM(k,K)1−γ




0 = c − 1+
α∗
1 +¯ x(VH − 1) − c
M(k,K)
(16)
maximizes the principal’s expected revenue and leaves no rent to the agent.
Proof: From the assumption that the unconditional distribution of the risk asset is VH with probability
1/2, VL with probability 1/2a n dE(V ) = 1, we deduce that VH − 1=1− VL.L e t¯ r =¯ x(VH − 1) =
¯ x(1 − VL). From Step 1, we deduce that the objective of the principal is to maximize
1 − k
2







(α0 − c)1−γ +
1+k
2
(α1 +1+¯ r − c)
1−γ ≥ ¯ UK (18)
The ﬁrst order condition of revenue maximization for the principal yields
(1 − k)(α0 − c)γ
(1 − K)
=
(1 + k)(α1 +1+¯ r − c)γ
(1 + K)
(19)




Step 2: Assume that the contract h∗ is proposed. Then, there exists ¯ c>0 such that if c<¯ c,t h e n
the agent exerts eﬀort.

















2(1 − γ)¯ UKM(k,K)1−γ
1 − K +( 1+K)M(k,K)1−γ
¶1/(1−γ)
(21)























U(Z)( 2 2 )






















U(Z)( 2 3 )
Given that Z is increasing in ¯ UK, W ed e d u c et h a tt h e r ee x i s t s¯ c1(¯ UK) > 0s u c ht h a ti fc<¯ c1(¯ UK),
we have the desired result.
Step 3: There exists ¯ ¯ U such that if ¯ UK < ¯ ¯ U, then, the expected revenue of the principal from hiring
an agent and proposing the contract h∗
K is strictly positive.













(1 + ¯ r − c − Z)










If Z is small then the RHS of this inequality is strictly positive. Denote ¯ ¯ c(¯ UK) the RHS of (24) as a
function of ¯ UK.G i v e nt h a tZ is increasing in ¯ UK, there exists ¯ Uo > 0, then the such that if ¯ UK < ¯ Uo
then ¯ ¯ c(¯ UK) > 0a n di fc<¯ ¯ c(¯ UK)t h e nRev > 0.
Hence, if ¯ UK < ¯ Uo and taking ¯ c(¯ UK)=Min(¯ c1(¯ UK),¯ ¯ c(¯ UK)), we have the desired result. 2.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y5 :
(i) Assume that for all K ∈ (k,1), ¯ UK = ¯ U. α∗
0 and α∗
1 are given by Equations (16) and (15), respectively.
M(k,K)i si n c r e a s i n gi nK and
µ
2(1 − γ)¯ UKM(k,K)1−γ
1 − K +( 1+K)M(k,K)1−γ
¶1/(1−γ)
is decreasing in K. As a consequence, we have the desired result.
(ii) From Equations (16) and (15), it is straightforward that α∗
0 and α∗
1 are increasing in ¯ U 2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :Denote Revj (j = k,K) the revenue of the principal is higher when hiring
an agent with the contract h∗
j. From Corollary 5, we know that RevK >R e v k.L e tD = RevK − Revk.
If the principal oﬀers the contract h∗
K, it is only accepted by an overconﬁdent agent. Therefore, the
expected revenue of the principal is θRevK. If the principal oﬀers the contract h∗
k, the contract is
accepted by both types of agents, hence the revenue of the principal is Revk.L e t¯ θ = Revk/RevK.I f
θ ≥ ¯ θ, then the principal proposes the contract h∗
k while if θ <≤ ¯ θ, the principal proposes the contract
h∗
K. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 :Given that ¯ U = 0, it is straightforward that for any contract of the shape of
(11) with parameters (α0,α1,β) such that an agent pays an eﬀort cost c, there exists a contract with
parameters (c,α0
1,1) which provides the same expected utility to an agent. In what follows, we focus
on this type of contracts.
Let ¯ R =1+¯ r. A separating equilibrium must satisfy the following conditions:
1) An overconﬁdent agent choosing the contract (c2,α2,1) is better oﬀ exerting a high eﬀort (i.e., paying
23c2)t h a ne x e r t i n gn oe ﬀort, i.e.,
1+K2
2






2 +( α2 + ¯ R)1−γ
´
(25)
2) An overconﬁdent agent choosing the contract (c2,α2,1) is better oﬀ exerting a high eﬀort (i.e.,
paying c2) than exerting a low eﬀort (i.e. paying a cost c1), i.e.,
1+K2
2
(α2 + ¯ R − c2)1−γ ≥
1 − K1
2
(c2 − c1)1−γ +
1+K1
2
(α2 + ¯ R − c1)1−γ (26)
3) An overconﬁdent agent choosing the contract (c2,α2,1) and exerting a high eﬀort is better oﬀ
than choosing the contract (c1,α1,1) and exerting a low eﬀort, i.e.,
1+K2
2
(α2 + ¯ R − c2)1−γ ≥
1+K1
2
(α1 + ¯ R − c1)1−γ (27)
4) An overconﬁdent agent choosing the contract (c2,α2,1) and exerting a high eﬀort is better oﬀ
than choosing the contract (c1,α1,1) and exerting no eﬀort, i.e.,
1+K2
2






1 +( α1 + ¯ R − c1)1−γ
´
(28)










1 +( α1 + ¯ R)1−γ
´
(29)
6) A rational agent choosing the contract (c1,α1,1) and exerting low eﬀort is better oﬀ than choosing
the contract (c2,α2,1) and exerting no eﬀort, i.e.,
1+k1
2






2 +( α2 + ¯ R)1−γ
´
(30)
7) A rational agent choosing the contract (c1,α1,1) and exerting low eﬀort is better oﬀ than choosing
the contract (c2,α2,1) and exerting a low eﬀort, i.e.,
1+k1
2
(α1 + ¯ R − c1)1−γ ≥
1 − k1
2
(c2 − c1)1−γ +
1+k1
2
(α2 + ¯ R − c1)1−γ (31)
8) A rational agent choosing the contract (c1,α1,1) and exerting low eﬀort is better oﬀ than choosing
the contract (c2,α2,1) and exerting a high eﬀort (i.e., paying c2), i.e.,
1+k1
2
(α1 + ¯ R − c1)1−γ ≥
1+k2
2
(α2 + ¯ R − c2)1−γ (32)
24A separating equilibrium is then a pair of contracts (ci,αi,1) (i =1 ,2) that maximizes the revenue
of the principal and satisﬁes constraints (25)-(32).
















(α2 + ¯ R − c2) < α1 + ¯ R − c1,






Step 2: For any contract (c,α,1) with c ≥ c1,i fα > − ¯ R, then there exists ¯ c1(α) such that if c1 < ¯ c1(α),
then low eﬀort is always preferred to no eﬀort.
Proof: If exerting low eﬀort, the proﬁtf r o mt h ec o n t r a c t( −c,α,1) is
1 − L1
2
(c − c1)1−γ +
1+L1
2
(α + ¯ R − c1)1−γ (33)




c1−γ +(α + ¯ R)1−γ¢
(34)
If c1 = 0, (33) is strictly larger than (34). Therefore, there exists ¯ c1(α)s u c ht h a ti fc1 < ¯ c1(α), then
low eﬀort is always preferred to no eﬀort.
This implies that if c1 is small enough, then constraints (25), (28), (29) and (30) are satisﬁed.
Step 3: Constraints (31) and (27) can be rewritten as
α2 <
½












(α1 + ¯ R − c1)+c2 − ¯ R (36)
25respectively. Denote F(α1)a n dG(α1), the right-hand sides of (35) and (36), respectively. A contract
must satisfy αi < 0, otherwise this contract generates a negative revenue for the principal. If F(0) >
G(0), then there exists contracts such that (27) and (31) are satisﬁed simultaneously. F(0) >G (0) is
equivalent to
½










( ¯ R − c1)+c2 − c1
Given that K2 >K 1,w ed e d u c et h a tt h e r ee x i s t sδ such that if c2 − c1 < δ,t h e nF(0) >G (0), i.e.,
Constraints (27) and (31) are satisﬁed simultaneously.
Step 4: Denote α∗
2 the unique solution of
1+K2
2
(α2 + ¯ R − c2)1−γ =
1 − K1
2
(c2 − c1)1−γ +
1+K1
2
(α2 + ¯ R − c1)1−γ (37)
(That is, α∗
2 is such that Constraint (26) holds with equality.)
As u ﬃcient condition for Constraint (26) and (27) to hold simultaneously, is that F(0) > α∗
2.R e w r i t i n g
Constraint (26), α∗
2 is the solution of




(c2 − c1)1−γ +
1+K1
1+K2
(α2 + ¯ R − c1)1−γ
¶1/(1−γ)
= H(α2)( 3 8 )
Given that H(α2) is an increasing function of α2, F(0) > α∗
2 is equivalent to
F(0) + ¯ R − c2 >H(F(0))

















( ¯ R − c1)+( c2 − c1)
#1−γ!1/(1−γ)
(39)
If c2 = c1, then the LHS of (39) is strictly larger than its RHS. Therefore, by continuity, there exists δ1
such that if c2 − c1 < δ1,t h e nF(0) > α∗
2.
Step 5: Steps 1 to 4 ensure that the set of contracts such that constraints (25)-(32) are satisﬁed is







(α1 + ¯ R − c1)+c2 − ¯ R (40)
26and denote G(α1), the RHS of this equation as a function of α1.L e t ˆ α be the unique solution of
F(α)=G(α).7 If α∗
2 ≤ F(ˆ α), then the principal chooses α1 =ˆ α and α2 = F(ˆ α)=G(ˆ α). If α∗
2 >F(ˆ α),
the principal chooses α2 = α∗
2 and α1 = G−1(α∗
2).












2 + ¯ R − c2)+c1 − ¯ R
As u ﬃcient condition for α∗
2 >F(ˆ α)i st h a tF(α∗
1) > α∗




















2 + ¯ R − c1 (41)
Since K2 >K 1, the LHS of (41) is strictly larger than its RHS at c2 = c1. By continuity, there exists
δ2 such that if c2 − c1 < δ2 then α∗
2 >F(ˆ α).
Step 6: For this menu of contracts to be an equilibrium, it must also be the case that the principal
does not have incentives to deviate from this equilibrium. First, From Step 2, we know that if c1 <
min(c1(α∗
2),c 1(G−1(α∗
2)), an agent always exert at least a low eﬀort. As a consequence, whatever the
contracts proposed by the principal, there cannot be a situation such that one type of agent exerts eﬀort
while the other does not. Second, the principal never deviates and proposes another menu of contracts
that satisﬁes constraints (25)-(32) since the menu derived in Step 5 maximizes his revenue in the set of
contracts such that an overconﬁdent agent exerts high eﬀort and a rational agent exerts a low eﬀort.
We deduce that the only potentially proﬁtable deviations for the principal are such that agents pool
on the same eﬀort level.
The most proﬁtable deviation such that agents pool on the high eﬀort level is a contract (c2, ˆ α2,1)




(ˆ α2 + ¯ R − c2)1−γ ≥
1 − k1
2
(c2 − c1)1−γ +
1+k1
2
(ˆ α2 + ¯ R − c1)1−γ (42)
Let ˆ ˆ α be such that (42) holds with equality.
Claim: There exists δ3 such that if c2 − c1 < δ3 then α∗
2 < ˆ ˆ α.
Proof: If c2 = c1, then the LHS of (42) is strictly larger than its RHS. Hence, by continuity, There exists
7Since F(α)a n dG(α) are increasing in α, F(0) >G (0), and F(c1 − ¯ R) <G (c1 − ¯ R), ˆ α is unique.
27δ3 such that if c2 − c1 < δ3 then α∗
2 < ˆ ˆ α.
It follows that the cheapest contract such that agents pool on the high eﬀort level is (c2, ˆ ˆ α,1). The





























Let ¯ δ = min(δ,δ1,δ2,δ3). If δ < ¯ δ then α∗
2 < ˆ ˆ α < 0. We deduce that Rev[Sep,1] >R e v (Poolh). As
a consequence, there exists ¯ θh < 1s u c ht h a ti fθ > ¯ θh, then there is no proﬁtable deviation such that
agent pool on the high eﬀort level.
The only thing left to be done is to show that there is no proﬁtable deviation such that agent pool
on the low eﬀort level.












(ˆ α1 + ¯ R)1−γ (43)
That is, a rational agent is indiﬀerent between paying a cost c1 and not. The expected revenue of the








Claim: Assume that 1+K2
1+K1 > 1+k1. There exists ˆ c and δ4 such that if c1 < ˆ c and δ < δ4,t h e nα∗
2 < ˆ α1.








1 +(ˆ α1 + ¯ R)1−γ
´¸1/(1−γ)
+ c1 − ¯ R = H1(ˆ α1)
Let H2(α)=H(α)+c2− ¯ R where H(α) is given by the RHS of (38). Then α∗
2 is the solution of α = H2(α).
Given that K2 >k 1,w eh a v e1−K1
1+K2 < 1
1+k1. Furthermore, we have assumed that 1+K1
1+K2 < 1
1+k1.A s
a consequence, there exist ¯ c2 and δ4 such that if c1 < ¯ c2 and δ < δ4, then for any α ∈ (c1 − ¯ R,0),
H2(α) <H 1(α). This implies that α∗
2 < ˆ α1.
28Now, assume that α∗
2 < ˆ α1. Rev[Sep,1] >R e v (Pooll) is equivalent to
(k2 − k1)(1 − ¯ r) − [(1 − k2)c2 − (1 − k1)c1] > (1 + k2)α∗
2 − (1 + k1)ˆ α1 (44)
Given that α∗
2 < ˆ α1 < 0, the RHS of (44) is negative. Therefore, there exists δ5 ≤ δ4 such that if
c2 − c1 < δ5, then the RHS of (44) is positive, hence Inequality (44) holds . As a consequence, there
exists ¯ θl < 1 such that if c2 − c1 < δ5 and θ > ¯ θl then Rev[Sep,θ] >R e v (Pooll) (i.e., there is no
proﬁtable deviation such that agent pool on the low eﬀort level.)
Taking ¯ θ =m a x ( ¯ θh, ¯ θl), ¯ δ =m i n ( δ,δ1,...,δ5)a n d¯ c =m i n ( c1(α∗
2),c 1(G−1(α∗
2),¯ c2), we have the
desired result. 2





w h i c hi sa ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fki.











Given that (VH + VL)/2=1 ,
Va r (R|ki)
dki < 0 is equivalent to ki > 0. Hence, Va r(R|k2) <Va r (R|k1).
2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 :Assume that the agent observes sH.( T h ep r o o ff o rt h ec a s esL is similar).
First, it is straightforward for any quantity diﬀerent from Z1, Z2 the market makers knows that he is
facing an insider. Hence, for any X diﬀerent from Z1, Z2,h es e t sP(X)=VH. Second, if the market
maker anticipates the insider to always trade a quantity Z2,t h e nh es e t sP(Z1)=1a n d
P(Z2)=
µK[(1 + k)VH +( 1− k)VL]+1
2µK +1
Therefore, for a separating equilibrium to exist, it must be the case that
(EK(V |SH) − P(Z2))Z2 > (EK(V |SH) − P(Z1))Z1






29If this inequality does not hold then the only equilibria are of pooling type. Assume that the insider
when observing sH chooses trades a quantity Z2 with probability µ and Z1 with probability (1−µ). A
pooling equilibrium must satisfy the following three conditions:
P(Z2,µ)=
µK[(1 + k)VH +( 1− k)VL]+1
2µK +1
P(Z1,µ)=
(1 − µK)[(1 + k)VH +( 1− k)VL]+1
2(1 − µK)+1
Z2 (EK(V |sH) − P(Z2,µ)) = Z1 (EK(V |sH) − P(Z1,µ))
This last equation is then equivalent to
4µ2(K − k)(ρ − 1) + 2µ[(K − k)(2 − 3ρ)+K(1 + ρ)] + K(1 − 3ρ)=0 ( 4 5 )
where ρ = Z2/Z1.
This completes the proof. 2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0 :Assume that ρ ≥ 3. The expected compensation of the agent is increasing
in his proﬁt. Therefore, we deduce from Proposition 9 that if the market maker anticipates that an
informed agent trades large quantities with probability 1, then an informed agents always trades large
quantities.
It is straightforward that the participation constraint of the agent is binding, i.e., his expected
compensation is ¯ UK. Therefore, we only need to check that the incentive compatibility constraint
on eﬀort holds and that the expected revenue of the principal is positive. Given the distribution of
uncertainty in the economy, VH −P(Z2)=P(−Z2)−VL. This implies that the incentive compatibility
constraint on eﬀort holds if ¯ UK > (¯ UK + c)/(1 + K). This is equivalent to c<K¯ UK.
The principal proposes the contract ho(π)i f
1 − k
2




2(¯ UK + c)
1+K
− Z2(VH − P(Z2))
¶
≥ 0( 4 6 )
Let Ek(V )=1
2[(1 + k)VH +( 1− k)VL]. Then, Inequality (46) is equivalent to
¯ UK + c<
1+K
1+k
Z2[Ek(V ) − 1]
Since c<K¯ UK,i f¯ UK <Z 2[Ek(V ) − 1]/(1 + k), we have the desired result.
30Assume now that ρ < 3. The contract proposed by the principal makes the agent indiﬀerent
between trading small and large quantities. As a consequence, he is willing to randomize and trade a
large quantity with probability µ∗
k and a small quantity with probability 1 − µ∗
k.I ns u c hac a s e ,p r i c e s
are as given in Proposition 9 (ii).
The incentive compatibility constraint on eﬀort is the same as in the case ρ ≥ 3, we only need to
check that the expected revenue of the principal is positive.
The mixed strategy equilibrium requires (Ek(V ) − P(Z1))Z1 =( Ek(V ) − P(Z2))Z2 = Π.T h e
principal proposes the contract gK if
1 − k
2









≥ 0( 4 7 )





Z2(VL − P(Z2)) + Π =
2
1+k
(Ek(V ) − P(Z2))Z2
Taking ¯ ¯ U as the RHS of this last inequality, we have the desired result. This completes the proof. 2
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